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RESUMO: O presente artigo-resenha examina o impacto potencial dos acordos comerciais 
megarregionais no Brasil como um terceiro país. A literatura inicialmente revisada identifica 
a “regulação profunda” proposta nos acordos mega-regionais como uma expressão 
de mudanças estruturais no sistema comercial internacional, o que, apesar da presente 
estagnação dessas negociações, aponta a relevância de escrutinar o seu impacto potencial 
em países excluídos. O artigo subsequentemente examina projeções feitas sobre os impactos 
econômicas de curto e médio prazos deste tipo de acordo comercial no Brasil como um 
terceiro país, e em seguida engaja-se com perspectivas que tratam as suas implicações 
estruturais de longo prazo.  
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ABSTRACT: The present review article examines the potential impact of mega-regional 
trade agreements on Brazil as a third-party. The literature initially reviewed identifies the 
“deep regulation” proposed in mega-regional agreements as an expression of structural 
changes within the global trading system, which in spite of the current stagnation of these 
negotiations highlights the relevance of scrutinizing their potential implications for outsiders. 
The article subsequently examines projections made of the short- and intermediate term 
economic impacts of this type of trade agreement on Brazil as a third-party, and here upon 
engages with perspectives treating their long-term structural implications.
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INTRODUCTION
As the focus of trade negotiations recently has been moving away from the 
multilateral track, the so called ‘mega-regional’ agreements have constituted the 
latest attempts to expand the depth and scope of international commercial 
regulation. Due to their preferential nature, questions have been raised about 
how these agreements might impact third-countries. Through scrutiny of recent 
literature treating the central characteristics and projected implications of these 
mega-regional dynamics, the present review article examines the position of 
Brazil as a likely outsider of these commercial trends. Although the two most 
advanced attempts at establishing mega-regional agreements, the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) are currently stalled, the present article departs from the premise that they 
reflect more fundamental changes within the global trading system, with a like-
lihood of concretizing in largely similar future treaties. Studies conducted to 
evaluate the potential effects of TTIP, TPP, and other less advanced mega-re-
gionals, on Brazil as a third-party are thereby believed to draw an approximate 
picture of the ramifications of Brazilian non-participation. In certain instances, 
projections of possible Brazilian inclusion in such treaties serve as a comparative 
parameter.
The article departs from a review of authors treating the advent of mega-re-
gionals as the latest wave of the recent changes away from multilateralism and 
towards preferentialism within the global trading system. Hereupon, literature with 
focus on the channels through which spillover effects of mega-regionals may affect 
third-parties is analyzed. This is followed by a review of projections made of the 
short- and intermediate term economic impacts on Brazil of agreements which so 
far have been on the table. Finally, contributions which incline towards analyzing 
the more long-term and structural consequences of mega-regionals on outsiders in 
general, – and Brazil in particular – are assessed.
The review indicates that systemic shifts within the global economy, with 
which mega-regionals are related, are bound to impact Brazil, – independently of 
the country participating or not. Yet, contrary to arguments often advanced in the 
Brazilian debate, the immediate short-term consequences of standing outside these 
agreements in terms of welfare effects either appear to be negligible, or even slight-
ly positive. Participation appears to imply detrimental consequences for the coun-
try’s already pressed manufacturing sector, while simultaneously cementing depen-
dency on exports of raw materials. Because the US and the EU have defined the 
content of mega-regional proposals so far, Brazil would not have much room to 
shape their rules in case of participation but would also be forced towards indirect 
normative adoption in the case of non-participation. Faced with these prospects, 
the present halt in the formation of mega-regional trade agreements should in fact 
suit Brazil.
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CRISIS OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADING  
SYSTEM AND SURGING PREFERENTIALISM
The slowdown of the multilateral trading system’s normative production has 
been held by different authors as a central factor in spurring alternative venues for 
the institutionalization of international trade relations. The inconclusiveness of the 
Doha negotiations is emphasized by Yong as symptomatic of the weakening of the 
multilateral track, which is explained by circumstances such as the multitude of 
new WTO members leading to more complex negotiations, post-2008 protection-
ism, and divisions between developed and developing countries (Yong, 2014). 
Through Low’s characterization, the WTO’s capacity to spur negotiation outcomes 
has gradually been diluted, wherefore the organization has been reduced to man-
agement of existing agreements and dispute settlement (Low, 2015, p.16).
The trend towards fragmentation of global trade has become evident as WTO 
member states increasingly make use of the provision in the Article 24 of the 1994 
agreement, which permits the formation of preferential trade agreements between 
two or more members1. Acharya et al. (2011) thus draw attention to a dual move-
ment, comprising of an exponential surge in preferential trade agreements since the 
early 1990s towards 2010, coupled with a trend from plurilateralism towards bi-
lateralism, meaning that more than 80% of agreements signed in this period were 
bilateral. This is referred to as a “changing structural configuration of PTAs’’ to-
wards bilateralism (p.38), which displays a tendency towards becoming increas-
ingly cross-regional. It thereby constitutes a strategic tool for states to gain market 
access in distant regions, but also has the effect of fragmenting international trade 
rules into a myriad of particular statutes pertaining to each specific agreement 
(Acharya et al., 2011).
The drivers behind the shift away from multilateralism and towards bilateral-
ism from the turn of the millennium have been treated by Wilson (2015). Herein, 
three root causes for this tendency are presented as; frustration with the multilat-
eral track, the urge of certain states to engage with more WTO Plus issues2, as well 
as a defensive rationale of avoiding trade isolation, as this sort of agreements be-
come increasingly common (Wilson, 2015, p.346). Anuradha also stresses how 
aversion in relation to exclusion from the quickly growing web of preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) motivates many governments to sign these treaties, with less 
consideration to their long term implications (Anuradha, 2016). 
Though some measure of scholarly agreement regarding the general movement 
1 Paragraph 1 through 8 of Article 24 permits the formation of customs unions or free-trade areas below 
a range of provisions related to border trade, refrainment from elevation of tariffs upon non-members, 
the timeframe for implementation, notification and information disclosure, and the elimination of duties 
on trade within the free-trade area/custom union.
2 ’WTO Plus’ issues refers to commitments which are more stringent, and which spans beyond those 
agreed upon in the original WTO agreement, such as those related to labor, environment, intellectual 
property rights, public procurement, competition policy, trade facilitation, and rules of origin.
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towards PTAs can be ascertained, its broader consequences appear rather more 
blurred. The fragmentary dynamics within the institutional framework(s) for global 
commerce have often been viewed with concern within the literature of international 
trade. Jagdish Bhagwati’s (2008) “spaghetti bawl” metaphor has frequently been used 
to describe the confusing situation brought about by a myriad of overlapping bi- and 
plurilateral trade relations permeating the global economy. Bhagwati assumes a criti-
cal stance towards the proliferation of PTAs, due to their exclusionary nature, and to 
the complexities and distortions which numerous rules of origin and overlapping 
regulations entail. The author furthermore highlights the asymmetries implied by 
PTAs in terms of non-trade related demands, which they may serve to impose par-
ticularly on developing nations, on behalf of developed countries (Bhagwati, 2008).
Another pitfall associated with the spread of PTAs, as accentuated by Josling, 
is that they might tend to grab the low-hanging fruits by concluding agreement on 
less complicated issues, referring more difficult matters to the WTO, and thus ulti-
mately leaving additional obstacles to solve within this forum (Josling, 2011, p.146). 
Yet, the recent surge of a myriad intertwined PTAs has, according to Solis and 
Wilson (2017), provided an incentive to seek more comprehensive arrangements. 
The context of a fragmented trading system thereby constitutes an explanatory 
background for the rise of mega-regional trade negotiations as a structural turn 
towards wider and more uniform commercial institutions (Solis & Wilson, 2017, 
p.11-12). In spite of the difficulties of effectively launching the mega-regionals – not 
least due to a variety of geopolitical concerns involved – such perspectives become 
interesting in so far as they approximate an explanation of the rise of this new 
template for trade agreements as a systemic response to the lack of an ordering 
framework for global trade. This makes it possible to view the attempts at con-
structing these treaties as part of a structural dynamic which might become mani-
fest through its concretizations in TTIP, TPP, and the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), but which cannot be limited to these specific nego-
tiation processes. This may be corroborated by Schwab and Bhatia, who stress that 
due to the stagnation at the WTO, “mega-regionals and other forms of plurilaterals 
may be the inevitable direction taken by likeminded countries in a globalized world’’ 
(Schwab & Bhatia, 2014, p.19).
At their presently embryonic state, some debate revolves around whether me-
ga-regionals may be viewed as an essentially novel pillar of the international trad-
ing system. Such perceptions appear to be evident in Meléndez-Ortiz’ characteriza-
tions of mega-regionals as a third constitutive element in the trend of regional 
integration, alongside cross-regional bilateral FTAs, and consolidative regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) which merge existing agreements (Meléndez-Ortiz, 2014, 
p.13). Nakagawa (2016) describes the advent of mega-regionals as the hitherto 
culmination of a turn towards the incorporation of non-tariff issues within the 
institutional framework for global commerce. Differently from Meléndez-Ortiz, 
Nakagawa does not present such agreements as fundamentally new, but rather as 
vehicles for the intensification of elements already embedded within existing FTAs, 
which relate to regulatory convergence and cooperation (Nakagawa, 2016).
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Although elements of deep-regulation may be visible in previous agreements, 
the expression which they assume through mega-regionals seems to be of an un-
precedented extent. A range of authors are also inclined to consider the mega-re-
gionals as something uniquely novel, due to the scale of the expansion of their 
regulatory scope, which constitutes a fundamental re-definition of the “national” 
normative space. The shift of attention away from tariff barriers, and towards the 
reduction of domestic trade obstacles and on regulatory hurdles is portrayed by De 
Bievre and Poletti as a change towards an essentially different trade agenda (De 
Bievre & Poletti, 2016, p.2). Bown (2017) highlights that while RTAs proliferating 
in the 1990s included non-tariff disciplines, the period after the financial crisis has 
seen increased demands from businesses in developed countries to reduce certifica-
tion-related and regulatory costs. Regulatory coherence between standards in the 
EU and the US has thus come to stand as an absolutely central part of the TTIP 
negotiations; both due to the goal of reducing divergence of regulation between 
these two regions, but also with a broader intention of seeing the global dissemina-
tion of these norms (Bown, 2017). The new disciplines on the table in these nego-
tiations have been summarized by authors in the area as public procurement, com-
petition policy, transparency measures, investment protection, intellectual property, 
environmental and labor standards, industrial policies, state-owned enterprises, as 
well as the harmonization and convergence around technical standards (Bull et al., 
2015; Carneiro, 2014; Hamilton & Blockman 2015). 
The TTIP appears to stand as the mega-regional proposal with the strongest 
degree of permeation of legislative areas normally situated within the scope of 
national political authority – also making it the object of much negative sentiment 
which apparently has stalled the further advance of its present configuration. This 
unprecedented allocation of regulative authority below the TTIP has made Young 
depict it as highly extensive in terms of both breadth and depth; comprising of a 
broad arrays of economic and administrative subfields, which become deeply re-
structured and inserted below the clauses of this accord (Young, 2016). The authors 
reviewed have thus been inclined towards associating mega-regionals with a dy-
namic within the global trading system, which implies a rather profound institu-
tionalization of internationally agreed norms and benchmarks at the national level, 
facilitating deep economic integration between signatories. It follows that due to 
the scope of the agreements under negotiation, they do not only wield the potential 
to intensify economic interactions between member states, but also constitute a 
process which depending on the specific provisions eventually established may 
impact third-countries significantly.
TRADE DIVERSION AND THIRD-PARTY IMPACTS
In The Custom Unions Issue (1950), Jacob Viner treated the consequences of 
preferential trade arrangements. While Viner stressed the potential for trade 
creation among the member states which such agreements might wield, he similarly 
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pointed towards the pitfall of trade diversion which the shift of procurement from 
a low-cost third-country, toward a high-cost member state might bring about (Viner, 
1950). It may thus be argued that an initial evaluation of the impact of mega-
regional trade agreements on third-countries should aim to assess the likely extend 
of trade diversion.
Some observers tend to deemphasize the risk of trade diversion in contempo-
rary global commerce. Hoekman (2015) underlines that the fact that relatively few 
tariff barriers exist between the global economic core regions today, means that the 
extend of trade diversion due to commercial integration probably also will be 
limited. Yet, the elimination of tariff peaks in specific sectors may still divert trade 
from countries excluded from these agreements (Hoekman, 2015, p.68-69). With 
regards to the TTIP, Gill et al. (2015) also point to the possibility that trade diver-
sion may imply negative effects on outsiders. Yet, as this only concerns goods 
produced in the EU or the US, the export composition of many developing countries 
– largely characterized by primary commodities often imported by both the EU and 
the US – means that trade diversion becomes less likely (Gill et al., 2015, p.7-8). 
The likeliness of trade diversion due to proliferating PTAs is also questioned by 
Mavroidis, who accentuates the lack of clear empirical evidence in relation to this 
question (Mavroidis, 2011).
Some measure of preoccupation can also be detected within the debates regard-
ing the potential for trade diversion resulting from preferential trade arrangements. 
Though Sorgho (2016) finds that the proliferation of RTAs since 1995 has been 
positively correlated with increases in global trade, he also detects a significant 
degree of trade diversion due to the “spaghetti bowl phenomenon”. Furthermore, 
membership of multiple RTAs is found to have a negative effect on the extend of 
direct trade creation of these agreements. Rather than promoting trade, the high 
administrative costs due to the superposition of RTAs are found to lead to consid-
erable trade diversion (Sorgho, 2016). This leaves the question of whether the 
signature of mega-regionals would further exacerbate this problem, or whether 
their uniformization of standards might help to alleviate the fragmentation of rule 
systems. 
Apart from direct effects in terms of trade creation- and diversion, Freytag et 
al. (2014) also expose some more indirect, yet potentially significant, implications 
associated with the establishment of mega-regional agreements. Such indirect ef-
fects may concretize as tariff-jumping3 or trade deflection4, but also through dy-
namic effects of liberalization. The latter refers to productivity gains of companies 
inside a free-trade area due to economies of scale and increased capital accumula-
3 Tariff jumping refers to a situation when enterprises from third-countries are pushed to establish direct 
representation/production inside a free-trade area in order to avoid external barriers.
4 Depending on rules of origin adopted within a given agreement, trade deflection may become evident 
as third-country producers ship goods into the area through the participant with the easiest access.
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tion, which tends to become evident in a long-term perspective (Freyteg et al., 2014) 
In a similar vein, Dadush points to the potentially detrimental consequences which 
such improvement of the competitive position of insider firms might wield on third-
country industries (Dadush, 2014). Increased attention towards dynamic effects 
therefore appears highly important in any preliminary analysis of the global im-
pacts of mega-regional agreements, in spite of the difficulties associated with the 
estimation of their gradually increasing significance over time. 
Notwithstanding the risk of traditional trade diversion associated with the 
lowering of tariff rates within large FTAs, scholarly discussions regarding mega-
regionals have mainly revolved around the possible consequences of mutual ap-
proximation of regulatory standards. Elliott hints at the dangers of “regulatory 
trade diversion”, as exporters from third-parties – often developing countries – face 
competitive disadvantages when harmonization results in highly complex standards 
(Elliott, 2016). Discrimination in NTB reductions, inconsequential reductions, and 
potentially increased costs of compliance are also highlighted by Francois et al. as 
central issues which might compromise third-parties standing outside such agree-
ments (Francois et al., 2013). The impact on third-countries of regulatory conver-
gence will likely depend on the particular mechanisms adopted. Options for regu-
latory convergence are manifold, but some central categories comprise of mutual 
recognition of standards5, harmonization6 of standards, and co-ordination7 (De 
Ville, 2016, p.4; Schoeder, 2016, p.495; Young, 2015, p.1256). Yet, a key point in 
this regard also appears to be related to the question of whether, and to what degree, 
these preferences are extended to outsiders. 
Another body of literature tends to emphasize the potential for positive spill-
overs on third-parties of regulatory convergence in mega-regional trade agreements. 
Akman et al., (2015) accentuate that in contrast to tariff preferences, regulatory 
changes are not inherently discriminatory. As follows, their potential to benefit 
third-parties depends on the particular shape they are given within the agreement, 
and of their level of restriction to insiders (Akman et al., 2015). In a similar vein, 
Aichele and Felbermeyer (2015) stress the importance of the specific rules estab-
lished for third-countries. Hereunder, it becomes highly relevant whether mutual 
recognition is made dependent on criteria which also may be open to producers in 
third-party countries, and whether less restrictive rules of origin are adopted 
(Aichele & Felbermeyer, 2015).
5 Mutual recognition of standards refers to the establishment of legal equivalence among a range of 
standards, so that the recognition in one-member state automatically entails recognition in the others, 
in spite of the different mechanisms of approval of the states in question. 
6 Harmonization of standards in trade agreements refers to the establishment of common standards and 
constitutes the deepest level of regulatory convergence.
7 Co-ordination of standard-setting refers to the mutual monitoring of testing procedures, information-
sharing and approximation of standards, without necessarily making them entirely equivalent.
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Regulatory harmonization among parties in a trade agreement may, according 
to a study conducted by Shepherd (2007), serve to increase exports from third-
countries to this area. This becomes contingent upon whether compliance costs 
surpass potential profit from simplification and universalization of standards. The 
study’s simulations indicate that even third-countries with high compliance costs 
may stand to benefit from the general harmonization process (Shepherd, 2007). 
Menon (2014) also stresses the “public good” character of the harmonization of 
standards, and the prospects of their eventual multilateralization, through accession 
by non-members, as a way out of the present fragmentation of the global trading 
system (Menon, 2014, p.481).
Baldwin (2014a) draws a clear distinction between tariff-related differentiations 
between insiders and outsiders in traditional trade agreements – characterized as hard 
preferences – and the regulatory elements of new trade agreements – referred to as 
soft preferences. In contrast to the exclusionary nature of the former, the latter are 
of a much more “leaky” character, making them more difficult to reserve for a certain 
group of member countries. Baldwin sustains that such trends within mega-regional 
trade agreements are more likely to benefit third-countries, than the hard prefer-
ences previously characterizing trade agreements (Baldwin, 2014a).
The increasing internationalization of commodity chains and cross-border in-
vestments are also held by Herwig (2016) as important factors which provide an 
incentive for insiders of trade agreements to avoid excessively high regulatory bar-
riers, to facilitate operations of enterprises active in third-countries. This even 
makes the author question whether the notion of national regulatory sovereignty 
is tenable, stressing that international economic interconnection might pose differ-
ent imperatives to seek a supra-national pooling of regulatory authority (Herwig, 
2016, p.268). Though little is known about the third-party impact of the “deep 
regulation” of mega-regionals, these more optimistic perspectives point to some 
highly complex impacts, which also makes it difficult to conclude that non-partic-
ipation, per-se, will wield negative implications.
A somewhat more critical stance towards the potential impact on third-
countries of the mega-regional agreements has been adopted by other authors 
within the field. Schmieg (2015) underscores the high degree of empirical uncertainty 
associated with the TTIP’s consequences for developing countries and claims that 
many assessments tend to be based on overtly optimistic presumptions. A crucial 
point relates to the adaptive capacity which developing countries possess in order 
to respond to changes in the regulatory framework within such an extensive free-
trade area (Schmieg, 2015). Ulgen also draws attention to the risk of regulatory 
trade diversion which the TTIP template implies for third-countries with a higher 
degree of exposure to international market changes (Ulgen, 2014). The same issues 
are raised by Ciuriak (2014) in relation to the TPP, who indicates that discriminatory 
NTB reductions and exclusion of service-providing developing countries, such as 
India, could have very negative impacts. Yet, more inclusive rules of origin and 
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investment liberalization are claimed to mitigate some of these consequences 
(Ciuriak, 2014, p.8). 
Chen and Matoo (2008) examine the impact of standards harmonization 
within a free-trade area on third-parties, according to the GDP and R&D expen-
ditures of these countries. The authors find a positive correlation to be evident 
between exports and GDP and R&D expenditures, respectively. In cases when re-
strictive rules of origin are adopted within trade agreements, benefits accrue exclu-
sively to members, at the expense of third-parties (Chen & Matoo, 2008). Thus, 
while this finding indicates that wealthy third-countries may benefit from harmo-
nization, it also hints at the negative spillovers implied by rigorous rules of origin, 
and risks of poorer countries not possessing the recourses to adapt to new regula-
tory norms.
A more pronounced degree of skepticism regarding the alleged beneficial spill-
over on third-parties is presented by Aggerwal and Evenett (2015). Apart from 
potential investment diversion away from third-countries and towards FTA mem-
bers, the authors also list a series of risks of regulatory discrimination, favoring 
insiders vis-a-vis outsiders in a trade agreement, such as; regulatory exemptions, 
favorable tests, faster reviews, leniency in punitive measures, broader appeal rights, 
and targeting of enforcement recourses towards members (p.47). The authors there-
fore highlight that as the focus of trade negotiations has moved towards behind-
border issues, new kinds of discrimination harmful to third-parties could well surge 
within this space (Aggerwal & Evenett, 2015).
Such preoccupations may also be supported by Matoo, who finds that while 
regional regulatory harmonization has the effect of increasing intra-regional trade, 
as well as exports from third-party developed countries, exports from developing 
third-party countries decline (Matoo, 2015). On a developing country firm-level, 
Maskus et al., also find that short-term adaption costs to developed country regu-
latory harmonization may constitute significant barriers of entry to these markets 
(Maskus et al., 2005). A revision of different perspectives on the third-party impact 
of “regulation intensive” PTAs thereby suggests that this element does wield sig-
nificant ramifications within the broader structures of global commerce. The par-
ticular impact though, appears to vary, and to be highly dependent on the adaptive 
capacity, existing domestic legislation, and sectorial composition of the specific 
third-country in question.
BRAZIL WITHIN THE GLOBAL TRADE DYNAMICS
With the structural transformation of the Brazilian economy from the early 
1990s, a re-orientation of Brazil’s global economic engagement was also sought. The 
significance of Mercosul as a center-piece for Brazilian international insertion became 
evident from this point in time. Though he stresses how Mercosul initially should be 
viewed as part of a neoliberal turn towards opening of the Brazilian economy, Bernal-
Revista de Economia Política  39 (1), 2019 • pp. 51-70
60
Meza highlights the change in Brasilia’s perception of the organization’s instrumental 
purpose over time, as it gradually came to serve as a means to resist the US’ attempts 
to spur region-wide liberalization through ALCA (Bernal-Meza, 2008). At the outset 
of the 21st century, Brazil dedicated many efforts at multilateral negotiations, which 
nonetheless became frustrated with the inconclusiveness of the Doha Round. Though 
a few extra-regional FTAs have been signed between Mercosul and a small handful 
of countries, the block’s present agreements can only be ascribed a very minor eco-
nomic significance (Mendoza, 2012).
The restrictions posed by the impossibility of negotiating on an individual 
country basis, due to the common external tariff, have made some observers high-
light the danger of commercial isolation in a context of negotiation of mega-region-
al agreements (Canuto, 2015; Illescas, 2015; Torezani, 2015), and call for a re-
orientation of Brazilian global economic integration (Braga, 2015; Pereira, 2013; 
Thorstensen, 2012). This points to the relevance of reviewing the possible conse-
quences of standing outside the process of mega-regional consolidation, through 
projections which so far have been on the table. 
A frequently cited study has been conducted by Thorstensen and Ferraz 
(2014), who examine the consequences of Brazilian exclusion from the TTIP and 
TPP, in scenarios implying different degrees of tariff and non-tariff reductions. The 
authors find that the consequences for Brazil of a successful conclusion of the TTIP 
would amount to a 0,6% drop in exports to this area, in the case of the complete 
elimination of tariff barriers, and a 5% drop in a scenario with complete tariff 
extinction and a 50% NTB reduction. The export losses in each of these scenari-
os amount to US$ 0,4 billion and US$ 3,8 billion, respectively. With regards to 
the third-party impact on Brazil of a successful TPP, Thorstensen and Ferraz find 
that exports to this area would fall by 0,4% in the case of the dismantling of 
tariff barriers, and by 2,7% if tariff barriers and 50% of NTBs are eliminated. In 
a simulation which includes China in the TPP, the fall in Brazilian exports to this 
zone would amount to 1,4% due to tariff abolishment, and to 5% if a 50% NTB 
reduction is added to this. A general evaluation of the authors’ findings thus points 
to the weight of NTBs, relative to tariff reductions. This suggests that exclusion 
from agreements that apply a strong focus on regulatory issues may lead to no-
table costs for Brazil, while the impacts from pure tariff reduction within free-
trade zones are relatively negligible.
A noteworthy element in Thorstensen and Ferraz (2014) can be found in their 
projections of the economic implications of the conclusion of preferential trade 
agreements among Brazil and the US and EU 27, in scenarios of different degrees 
of tariff and NTB reduction, which are listed in Table 1 below:
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Table 1: Changes in Brazilian exports and imports with the EU 27 and the US  







Tariff elimination with the EU 27 21,2% 43,7%
Tariff elimination with the US 9,9% 43,6%
Tariff elimination with the EU 27 + 25% NTB reduction 57,4% 71,3%
Tariff elimination with the US + 25% NTB reduction 47,6% 75,9%
Tariff elimination with the EU 27 + 50% NTB reduction 97,5% 101%
Tariff elimination with the US + 50% NTB reduction 93,5% 112,4%
Source: Adaption from Thorstensen and Ferraz (2014).
Though very marked gains in terms of export increases can be registered, im-
ports surge even more significantly in all of the scenarios listed, indicating the po-
tential of trade balance deficits. Thus, without neglecting the possible welfare gains 
of closer integration into global commodity chains, the costs from non-participa-
tion should nevertheless be held up against the costs of participating in agreements 
in which the gains of competitive export-sectors may not surpass the losses incurred 
by less competitive domestic industries.
Brandão (2015) focuses his projections on the specific sectorial repercussions 
of tariff eliminations between the EU and the US. Though tariff reductions usually 
are seen as less important in mega-regionals when compared to regulatory changes, 
certain sector peaks – specifically within agriculture – do point to the relevance of 
examining how tariff phase-out between the US and the EU might affect Brazil. In 
a simulation of complete tariff elimination in all sectors between the US and EU, 
the indirect effect on Brazilian exports are fairly negligible, totaling a loss of some 
US$ 169 million, while Brazil’s imports decline by some US$ 313 million. In a 
second simulation, all tariffs in all sectors are eliminated among the EU, the US, 
and Brazil. In this scenario, Brazilian exports of meat and sugar would surge by 
US$ 17,7 billion and US$ 4,5 billion, respectively, while exported manufactures 
would decline by US$ 6,4 billion. Brazilian manufacture imports would rise by US$ 
16 billion and the total increase in imports of US$ 22,9 billion would be consider-
ably higher than the projected total rise in exports of US$ 5,6 billion. Production 
of meat and sugar would thus augment by 38% and 24,4% respectively, which 
would be accompanied by a fall in domestic manufacturing of 6%, and in soybean 
production of 8%. In likeness with Thorstensen and Ferraz (2014), Brandão’s re-
sults reveal that the immediate implications of commercial opening for Brazil could 
well be associated with a deterioration in the trade balance. The findings also draw 
attention towards the risk that increased commercial integration with the US and 
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the EU might exacerbate Brazil’s global insertion as a raw material exporter and 
push further in the direction of domestic de-industrialization.
Aichele et al., (2014) analyze the consequences of a TTIP conclusion for third-
countries. The authors project the changes in trade flows between a range of sig-
natories and third-countries, under the presumption that all transatlantic tariff 
barriers are eliminated, and that NTBs are reduced to an average level for existing 
PTAs. The study finds that the conclusion of TTIP would lead to a decline in Brazil-
ian exports and value added transfers in the case of both member countries and 
third-parties, as is displayed in Table 2 below:
Table 2: Trade effects on Brazil of the conclusion of the TIPP
% Change in trade flows and value added 








Source: Adaption from Aichele et al., (2014).
While Brazilian exports and value added transfers to the EU 27 remain un-
changed, a moderate decline can be registered in the case of ASEAN and China, 
and a more significant fall becomes evident with regards to the US, Canada, and 
Mexico. This finding indicates that the TTIP’s third-party impact on Brazil will be 
somewhat negative. 
Yet, one of the central pillars of the TTIP relates to the ambition of reaching a 
high degree of regulatory convergence and harmonization. The study therefore 
contains simulations in which the premise of moderate NTB reductions is changed 
to significant standards harmonization. Due to the reduction of production costs 
for export sectors in third-countries, positive spillovers in terms of GDP increases 
are registered for the group of non-TTIP countries, ranging between 0,23-1,21%. 
In this projection, Brazil appears within the Mercosul group, which accounts for a 
GDP increase between 0,18-0,84%, depending on the extent of positive spillover 
effects from intra-TTIP harmonization. Thus, when the potential positive effects of 
regulatory harmonization spillovers are taken into account, it becomes more dif-
ficult to make a conclusive evaluation of whether the TTIP would affect Brazil 
negatively. So, in spite of painting a muddy picture of the particular consequences 
of standards harmonization within mega-regionals, in likeness with Thorstensen 
and Ferraz (2014), the projections of Aichele et al., do point to the undeniable 
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significance of the complex effects associated with regulatory convergence, relative 
to traditional logics of exclusion/inclusion. 
A study conducted by Felbermeyer et al., (2013) draws up a less dim scenario 
of the third-party impact on Brazil, associated with the signature of a transatlantic 
free-trade agreement in the moulds of the TTIP proposal. As these projections sug-
gest a considerable welfare effect of tariff and/or NTB liberalizations between the 
EU and the US, they therefore also indicate that a few select raw material produc-
ers would stand to increase exports, and concomitantly also experience a positive 
impact on GDP. Noticeably, the study indicates that Brazil stands as one of the few 
developing countries to see indirect welfare gains from the TTIP: while the tariff 
reduction scenario results in a 0,5% increase in Brazilian GDP, the “deep liberaliza-
tion” scenario – which implies a significant NTB reduction and investment facilita-
tion element – results in a 2,1% increase in Brazilian GDP. It should be noted that 
Felbermeyer et al., (2013) stands out in the category of economic impact studies, 
as its country-projections of either positive or negative GDP variations are much 
more highly estimated than those of other research projects within this area. In this 
regard, it is remarkable to observe how Brazil as an outsider is expected to grow 
up to 2,1% due mainly to increased raw material demand in member countries.
Cai et al., (2015) also conduct a projection of the third-country impact of a 
TTIP conclusion, implying tariff and non-tariff barrier reductions. The authors 
operate with the assumption that 20% of NTB reductions among member countries 
will spill over onto outsiders. The study finds that in the case of Brazil, these effects 
surpass losses due to trade diversion, leading to a 0,33% increase in aggregated 
Brazilian exports, and a 0,29% increase in aggregated imports. This is a accompa-
nied by a 0,1% GDP increase. At a 2027 benchmark, exports to the US and EU are 
thus expected to increase by 4,7% and 1,6% due to positive spillovers of the TTIP. 
The authors find that trade substitution effects means that Brazil increases exports 
to all of the other BRICS countries, with 0,21% in the case of China, 0,16% for 
India, 0,77% for South Africa, and 1,07% for Russia.
Fleishhaker et al., (2016) focus on assessing the likely impact of a handful of 
mega-regional agreement proposals on the Latin American countries. The study 
projects different scenarios of real income and sector-wise change departing from 
the conclusion of the TTIP, TPP, RCEP, and the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP). The authors find that the TTIP, the TPP, and the RCEP, would leave Bra-
zil as a third-party virtually unaffected in terms of GDP change, varying from -0,1% 
in the former cases to 0% in the latter. In the case of the FTAAP – the agreement 
at the most incipient stage – a more significant effect of a 1,95% increase in Brazil-
ian GDP is found to be evident. Yet, these projections do suggest that flows and the 
composition of Brazil’s exports would be significantly altered by the mega-region-
als. Thus, while the TPP would lead to a 4,4% increase in exports to China, Fleish-
haker et al., find that these would undergo a leap of 84% below the FTAAP due to 
surging Chinese commodity demand. European imports of Brazilian raw material 
inputs are also found to rise under the TTIP, which nonetheless is negatively com-
pensated by declines in Brazilian exports to the US and China. The authors’ findings 
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also indicate that the value added effects of the mega-regionals only would be 
positive in the case of the Brazilian mining sector, while negative impacts are reg-
istered in the case of manufacturing. It is therefore highlighted that the indirect 
effects of the mega-regionals might well be to further lock Brazil into a role as a 
global primary commodity supplier.
Finally, Cerdeiro (2016) projects the impacts of the TPP on different Latin Amer-
ican and Caribbean countries through simulations of tariff liberalization, with or 
without NTB reductions. The third-party impact of tariff liberalization within the 
TPP area on Brazil as a non-participant are found not to affect Brazilian GDP, while 
full tariff liberalization and NTB reductions are estimated to lead to a drop in the 
lower end of 0,1% – leaving the Brazilian economy essentially unaffected. In simula-
tions in which Brazil joins the TPP, a modest GDP increase of 0,18% is found in the 
tariff liberalization scenario, while the tariff + NTB scenario is associated with a 
0,25% rise, indicating relatively modest gains derived from participation.
STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS FOR BRAZIL
From the projections reviewed, it becomes very difficult to draw any definitive 
conclusions with regards to the immediate consequences of Brazil standing outside 
the mega-regional agreements. Though some estimates indicate losses due to trade 
diversion, most tend to suggest that the positive spillover effects of regulatory har-
monization and increased commodity demand either means that the Brazilian 
economy is unaffected, or even positively impacted. Yet, it should be noted that 
these studies mainly focus on yielding information about the measurable short- and 
intermediate term consequences for Brazil as a third-country. The possible global 
consolidation of mega-regional agreements would also wield a range of significant 
structural implications, characterized by greater complexity in terms of their detec-
tion, but with potentially deeper repercussions. 
It therefore becomes interesting to observe how some of the studies reviewed 
suggest an increased participation of primary commodities within the structure of 
Brazilian exports, both in scenarios in which Brazil joins, or stand outside different 
proposed mega-regional agreements. These findings should thereby feed into re-
cently expressed worries of gradual de-industrialization (Dávila-Fernándesz, 2015) 
symptoms of commodity-induced Dutch disease (Bresser-Pereira et al., 2016; Bacha 
& Fishlow, 2011) as well as the relatively declining significance constituted by 
manufactures and high technology inputs within Brazilian exports (Cunha et al., 
2013; Pereira & Dathein, 2016), and the challenges of tapping into global value 
chains (Hiratuka & Arti, 2017). Crossing such considerations with the findings of 
the projections reviewed might support the core argument in Rodrik et al., (2004), 
who underline how the enhancement of economic performance rests on improve-
ment of domestic productive institutions, rather than on increasing openness to 
international trade per-se, which in the absence of the first condition even might 
lead to a negative effect on welfare (Rodrik et al., 2004).
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A no less important issue regards how the rise of mega-regionals might position 
Brazil in relation to the emerging sites of rule-making for a substantial part of 
global economic interaction. Independently of the eventual obstacles for their near 
future materialization, the rising wave of prefenrentialism within the global trade 
order, of which the mega-regionals are part, is held by Winters as inherently asym-
metrical, and as a preoccupying threat to multilateralism (Winters, 2015). A very 
contrary perception can be detected in Mercurio, who welcomes the mega-region-
als as a possibility for the US to circumvent developing countries such as Brazil, 
India, and China by proliferating its preferred standards and norms, which subse-
quently can be “multilateralized” through the WTO, when they already have be-
come globally prevalent (Mercurio, 2014). 
The possibility that the conclusion of the TTIP would subordinate the WTO 
to a secondary status is also emphasized by Silva, meaning that this organization 
would be reduced to implementation of rules agreed upon between a range of select 
parties (Silva, 2014, p.394). This raises the question of whether the mega-regionals 
actually fall within Keohane and Morse’s (2014) category of “contested multilat-
eralism” as alternative institutional vehicles of establishing rules outside the mul-
tilateral track. Though the varying degree of exclusivity of these negotiations might 
conflict with the authors’ definition of this trend as “multilateral responses”, the 
general account of coalitions contesting the status quo “when change in existing 
multilateral institutions is difficult” does hold some similarities with the back-
ground for the proliferation of mega-regional negotiations (Keohane & Morse, 
2014, p.386-387).
There appears to be clear consensus within IPE literature, that the broader 
political and economic significance of who makes the rules for global commercial 
interaction is far from trivial. Eliasson and García-Duran thus stress the character 
of the TTIP as a “geopolitical game-changer” as it would constitute a mechanism 
of “regulatory export”, in accordance with which third-countries would have had 
to adapt (Eliasson & García-Duran, 2016). The costs which particularly developing 
countries may incur as they conform to developed-country standards are strongly 
emphasized by Maur and Shepherd, who also stress how this might not result in a 
“socially optimal level of regulation” for these states (Maur & Shepherd 2011, 
p.197). In a similar vein, Falk and Unmusig maintain that even though developing 
countries might join the mega-regionals, most of them would adopt pre-defined 
standards “through the back door” and would not gain status as “rule setters” (Falk 
& Unmusig, 2014). Baldwin also associates the conclusion of the TTIP of the TPP 
with the inevitability that Chinese, Indian, or Brazilian enterprises eventually would 
have to abide by developed country standards. Though Baldwin does point to some 
potentially positive implications of such an internalization, he nonetheless also 
stresses how this might entail certain undesirable restrictions for producers in these 
countries (Baldwin, 2014b).
When evaluating mega-regional trade agreements’ character as a norm-setting 
project of power projection, the temporal context in which they are devised also 
appears to become relevant. De Bievre and Poletti (2014) pinpoint how the erosion 
Revista de Economia Política  39 (1), 2019 • pp. 51-70
66
of the EU’s bargaining power became evident during the Doha Round, which from 
the late 2000s pushed the Union away from multilateralism and towards engage-
ment in PTA negotiations (De Bievre & Poletti, 2014, p.33). In line with Gantz and 
Nielsen (2016), the North Atlantic economic superpowers presently have a his-
torical opportunity to shape the rules of the global trading system, which in a few 
decades will be bygone with the increasing influence of developing countries such 
as China, India, and Brazil (Gantz & Nielsen, 2016). Carneiro also paints a bleak 
picture of the possible consolidation of mega-regionals in relation to Brazil, which 
effectively would be excluded from the governance of world trade (Carneiro, 2014). 
As the commercial participation of developing countries becomes ever more ac-
centuated globally (Dadush, 2015), as well as in the Brazilian import-export com-
position (Farias, 2015, p.8), the question remains as to whether the present halt of 
the mega-regionals, and their possible postponement at least towards the early 
2020s, might in fact have been generally beneficial for developing countries – and 
in particular for Brazil? 
CONCLUSIVE SUMMARY
The revision of literature treating the transformations of the global trading 
system, away from multilateralism and towards preferentialism, points to the in-
creasing importance of regulatory convergence and other non-tariff related issues. 
In spite of the significant obstacles prohibiting their ratification or final conclusion, 
the mega-regional trade agreements examined stand as a present culmination of 
the concretization of these trends. The projections of their impact on Brazil as a 
third-party may thus help to shed light on how these underlying dynamics of legal/
regulatory streamlining shape the future premises for Brazilian participation with-
in international commerce. The present examination of studies within the area has 
been structured in order to differentiate assessments of short-term and long-term 
effects. Revisions of projections of the short-term economic impacts on Brazil pro-
vide very mixed conclusions, mainly ranging from negligible to slightly positive. 
These studies also indicate that participation could mean that Brazil lost out in 
value added sectors, while its position as a raw material provider would be ce-
mented, and also point to serious trade balance issues. The long-term implications 
of the mega-regionals are strongly related to participation in the establishment of 
rules for world trade. The reviews indicate that in their present format, mega-re-
gional proposals have been strongly defined by the US and the EU. Thus, if the 
agreements had materialized, these rule-sets would either be directly imposed on 
Brazil if it sought posterior integration within the mega-regionals – as through the 
EU-Mercosul negotiations – or indirectly, in the case of Brazilian non-participation, 
as they would shape the normative foundation for global trade. Contrary to argu-
ments postulating the need for Brazilian participation, the present review article 
indicates that for now, these agreements’ non-materialization may be indeed be 
rather preferable to the second largest economy of the Americas. 
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